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Abstract
A society that believes wealth to be determined by random “luck” rather than by merit,
demands more redistribution. The theoretical literature shows that any increase in the volatility
of income caused by unpredictable adverse shocks implies a higher support for redistribution. We
present evidence of this behavior by exploiting a natural experiment provided by the L’Aquila
earthquake in 2009, which hit a large area of Central Italy through a series of destructive shakes
over eight days. Matching detailed information on the ground acceleration registered during each
shock with survey data about individual opinions on redistribution we show that the average
intensity of the shakes is associated with subsequent stronger beliefs that, for a society to be
fair, income inequalities should be levelled by redistribution. The shocks, however, are not all
alike. We find that only the last three shakes - occurred on the fourth and the eighth day of
the earthquake - have a statistically significant impact. Overall, we find that the timing and
repetition of the shock play a role in shaping redistributive preferences.
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1 Introduction
Redistributive policies rely on the prevailing beliefs about the fairness of social competition.
Previous research suggests that if a society believes that socioeconomic success only depends on
merit, and that everyone should fully enjoy the fruits of her work, it will demand low redistribution.1
If, instead, the belief prevails that wealth is mostly determined by random “luck”, such as the fortune
of being born in the right place into the right family, society will support higher redistribution
thus levying heavier taxes (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Empirical
studies provide individual-level evidence that a stronger belief that luck matters in determining one’s
position in the social ladder is associated to higher support for redistribution (Fong, 2001; Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2005). Even if agents largely inherit their beliefs from ancestors (Guiso et al., 2006),
individual perceptions about the competing roles of luck and merit also are the outcome of a life-
long learning process. Unfortunate experiences can support the belief that luck, instead of merit,
plays a decisive role in income distribution, thereby raising aversion to inequality and consensus for
redistributive policies (Piketty, 1995). Alesina and Angeletos (2005) theoretically show that any
increase in the role of “pure random luck” in observed inequality - for example the one caused by
an unpredictable shock raising the volatility of income - implies a higher optimal tax rate resulting
in a stronger demand for redistribution. This mechanism is driven by a preference for fairness,
which leads people to support redistribution against “social injustice”, defined as welfare allocations
resulting from random luck instead of merit.
We test this theory by exploiting a natural experiment provided by the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake,
one of the strongest and most destructive seismic events registered in Italy in the last 40 years. The
earthquake consisted of an initial shock occurred on April 6, 2009 and dozens of aftershocks, seven
of which had a moment magnitude larger than or equal to 5, over the following days until April 13,
2009. A natural disaster is indeed a manifestation of “pure random luck”, in this case the misfortune
of living in the wrong place at the wrong time, which demonstrates the volatility of material wealth
and how exogenous events can destroy the outcomes achieved with merit.
We build a novel dataset that matches the peak ground acceleration (PGA) of each shock recorded
throughout the National Strong Motion Network during the earthquake with nationally represen-
tative survey data about individual opinions and beliefs collected 18 months after the shocks by
1Following Alesina and Angeletos (2005), hereafter we will refer to merit as the quality of being worthy of reward
resulting from talent and effort.
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the Italian National Election Studies (ItaNES). The empirical analysis illustrates how, consistently
with theory, the average intensity of the shakes registered throughout the L’Aquila earthquake is
associated with subsequent stronger beliefs that, for a society to be fair, income inequalities should
be levelled by redistribution. The analysis of the single shocks occurred between April 6 and 13,
however, reveals that this result is driven by the impact of the last three shakes, suggesting that
the timing and repetition of the shock also play a role in shaping redistributive preferences. Despite
having been destructive, the first five shakes show no statistically significant impact. The PGA of
the three final shocks occurred between April 9 and 13, instead, predicts preferences for redistri-
bution, as if some sort of cumulative effect of the shocks has been at stake. Though new in the
economics literature, this result is consistent with psychological theories explaining the different be-
havioral outcomes of single versus multiple shocks as resulting from a dose-response relationship. It
is commonly accepted in psychology that repeated shocks prompt stronger emotional and behavioral
responses (e.g. Turner and Lloyd, 1995; Green et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2007).
The natural experiment provided by the earthquake allows circumventing the endogeneity prob-
lems that are usually at stake in the analysis of individual preferences and opinions. There are
several reasons to safely rule out population self-selection into the province of L’Aquila along spe-
cific personal characteristics such as risk attitudes. First, no seismic event was registered in the area
over the previous 24 years, when the province of L’Aquila was hit by a non-destructive earthquake
that did not cause fatalities or injuries in 1985. Second, according to the National Institute of Geo-
physics and Volcanology (Istituto Nazionale di Geofisica e Vulcanologia, INGV), the 1985 earthquake
did not alter the seismic classification of the epicentral area that was first assessed in 1927, when
L’Aquila and the surrounding municipalities were classified as “zone 2” areas, a very broad category
comprising 27% of Italian municipalities. The demographic balance and the migration balance of
the epicentral area and the surrounding provinces have proved stable over the following two decades,
suggesting that the event did not prompt any precautionary emigration (Istat, 2013a; 2013b). Third,
data clearly show that no significant emigration flows occurred over the years following the 2009
earthquake.2
The omission of relevant variables may also prevent a correct identification of the impact of
the shocks. Since preferences for redistribution can be affected by personal traits, we control for
2The crude rate of net migration (plus statistical adjustment) expressed per 1000 inhabitants is equal to -
0.3, 1.0 and 0.4 in 2009, 2010 and 2011, respectively, for the province of L’Aquila (data are sourced from
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/data/database).
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demographic characteristics, socio-economic status, political opinions, religious beliefs, and possible
downturns in the economic well-being of the household. Moreover, we control for unobserved geo-
graphical factors by adding province fixed effects, and city-level variables, including the seismicity
of the municipality.
To rule out the possibility that our results capture spurious correlations, we then develop a
series of counterfactuals by generating placebo earthquakes with the same intensity and propagation
pattern of the last three L’Aquila main shakes but having their epicenter in the centroid of each of
the 6,684, 6,914, and 6,846 municipalities outside the actual epicentral areas, for a total of 20,444
placebo shakes. We then estimate the relationship of these shakes with support for redistribution.
Given the relevance of repeated exposure to traumatic shocks, we also repeat the placebo procedure
excluding from the sample of counterfeit epicenters those municipalities where at least one of the
previous five main shakes was felt (5915, 5917 and 5921 respectively, for a total of 17,753 shocks).
The different placebo tests support our results. To test the diverse outcomes associated to single
versus multiple shocks, we exploit a natural counterfactual provided by an earthquake occurred
in the province of Parma approximately 3.5 months before the L’Aquila earthquake, on December
23, 2008, which consisted of a single shake. Though being comparable in magnitude to the shakes
registered over the L’Aquila event, the PGA of the Parma single shake does not have any significant
relationship with preferences for redistribution in our sample.
Our contribution bridges three strands of literature. The first investigates the determinants of
the individual demand for redistribution by analyzing the role of the macroeconomic environment
(Giuliano and Spilimbergo, 2014), mobility prospects (Piketty, 1995; Bénabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina
et al., 2018) fairness (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009; Durante et al.,
2014), beliefs about equality of opportunities (Fong, 2001; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005), religion
(Guiso et al. (2006); Dills and Hérnandez-Julian, 2014; Kirchmaier et al., 2018), linguistic diversity
(Desmet et al., 2009), altruism (Dahlberg et al., 2012), racism (Lee et al., 2010), and aspects of
social capital (Algan et al., 2016; Cerqueti et al., 2016). We add to this field by exploiting a natural
experiment to test the role of exogenous unfortunate events in support for redistribution. Such a
mechanism was only implicitly hypothesized in Piketty (1995) and theoretically demonstrated by
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) but, to the best of our knowledge, it was never empirically tested in
the literature.
The second strand studies the effect of natural disasters on macroeconomic and behavioral out-
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comes such as institutional change (Belloc et al., 2016), growth (Skidmore and Toya, 2002), trust
(Toya and Skidmore, 2014), risk attitudes (Eckel et al., 2009; Said et al., 2015; Hanaoka et al.,
2018), well-being (Rehdanz et al., 2015), and time preferences (Callen, 2015; Cassar et al., 2017).
We contribute to this literature in several substantive ways. This paper is the first investigating
the relationship between natural disasters and redistributive preferences. We suggest that natural
disasters can trigger a change in social preferences that might have consequences on redistributive
policies. In addition, we exploit the peculiar timing of the natural experiment provided by the
L’Aquila earthquake - which lasted eight days in the form of a first strong shake and a series of
equally destructive aftershocks - to study the possible role of repeated shocks. Finally, we differen-
tiate from previous studies by operationalizing a continuous measure of the intensity of the shocks
that captures exactly how hardly the shakes are felt by inhabitants. With a few exceptions (Bernile
et al., 2017 and Hanaoka et al., 2018), economics studies measure the exposure to natural disasters
through dichotomic or categorical indicators.3 Finally, we add to the psychological literature study-
ing the different outcomes of single versus multiples traumas by showing that such differences also
concern the effect of non-interpersonal shocks on specific and so far uninvestigated social preferences
such as support for redistribution (e.g. Turner and Lloyd, 1995; Green et al., 2000; Williams et al.,
2007; Mustanski et al., 2016; Rytwinski et al., 2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the dataset we assembled by
matching the information concerning the L’Aquila earthquake with survey data and the empirical
strategy. Section 3 presents the econometric analysis and discusses the robustness and interpretation
of results. In section 4 we draw some concluding remarks.
2 Data and empirical strategy
2.1 The Italian strong motion database and the L’Aquila earthquake
Data on the L’Aquila earthquake are drawn from the Italian strong motion database ITACA
(ITalian ACcelerometric Archive), which was developed during different projects in the framework
of an agreement between the Italian Department of Civil Protection (Dipartimento della Protezione
Civile, DPC) and the INGV. The current release of the database (v. 2.3, January 2018) contains
3Bernile et al., 2017 measure the magnitude of disasters through two variables capturing the number of injuries and
fatalities and the amount of financial losses, respectively. Hanaoka et al., 2018 measure the intensity of the exposure
to the Great East Japan Earthquake through an indicator of the distance from the epicenter.
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36,714 three-component accelerometric waveforms generated by 1,640 earthquakes with magnitude
greater than 3.0 occurred in Italy between February 1972 and December 2017 (Luzi et al., 2017).
ITACA contains strong motion data recorded by the major Italian networks as well as, for events
occurred at the Italian borders, by neighboring networks abroad. As shown in figure 1, a total of
1,337 accelerometric stations are currently in operation, with an average spacing between stations of
approximately 20 km (Gorini et al., 2010). Most stations (673) belong to the Italian Strong Motion
Network (IT) − also known as Rete Accelerometrica Nazionale (RAN) − operated by DPC, and 259
belong to the Italian National Seismic Motion Network (IV), operated by INGV.
Figure 1: Map of the seismic networks included in the ITACA v. 2.3 strong motion database.
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data described in the text.
6
For each seismic event the accelerometric stations record the peak ground acceleration (PGA,
cm/s2) of the shake. PGA is the largest peak acceleration recorded at a site during a seismic event.
Unlike the Richter and moment magnitude scales, it is not a measure of the total energy of the
earthquake, but rather of how hard the earth shakes on the surface at a given geographic point
(Douglas, 2003). It thus provides an objective indicator of the intensity with which the shakes are
perceived by residents.
On April 6 2009, 01:32:40 UTC, an earthquake of moment magnitude MW 6.3 occurred close to
L’Aquila, a town of 68,500 inhabitants in Central Italy. The hypocenter was located at a depth of
8.3 km along a NW-SW normal fault with SW dip (i.e. the angle formed by the fault plane and
the horizontal direction). About 300 people died because of the collapse of residential and public
buildings, and damage was widespread in L’Aquila and its neighboring municipalities (Ameri et al.,
2009). Table 1 reports the metadata of the L’Aquila earthquake and its main aftershocks. We observe
seven aftershocks of moment magnitude larger than or equal to 5, the strongest of which occurred on
April 7 (MW = 5.6) and April 9 (MW = 5.6;MW = 5.4) (Ameri et al., 2009). A total of 19 weaker
(ML between 4.0 and 5.4) yet again surface (H ≤ 17.1 km) shocks were recorded by a radius of
15-20 km around the mainshock’s epicenter during the same day and the following three days (Luzi
et al., 2017). The effects of the L’Aquila event were recorded by a total of 62 ITACA accelerometric
stations. The event represents the fourth largest earthquake recorded by strong motion instruments
in Italy (i.e. since 1972), after the 23/11/1980 MW 6.9 Irpinia, the 30/10/2016 MW 6.5 Norcia,
and the 06/05/1976 MW 6.4 Friuli earthquakes, and it is the only big earthquake whose information
can be matched with subsequent survey data concerning preferences for redistribution. Table 1 also
includes the metadata of the earthquake occurred in the province of Parma approximately three
months before, which will be used to compare the impact of single and multiple shocks in Section
3.2.
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In our empirical analysis, we first use the average PGA recorded across these different shakes
to measure the intensity with which the earthquake was felt at each geographic location between
the first (IT-2009-0009) and the last (IT-2009-0174) shake, which occurred on April 6 and 13, 2009,
respectively. Figure 2 shows the PGA values locally recorded by the 62 stations over the whole
Italian territory sorted by time of occurrence.
Figure 2: PGA spatially interpolated contours based on PGA values recorded by the ITACA ac-
celerometric stations during the Parma earthquake (IT-2008-0004) and the L’Aquila earthquake’s
main shakes (IT-2009-0009 onwards)
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data described in the text.
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The maximum PGA value of the first shake (IT-2009-0009) − representing one of the highest
values ever recorded in Italy (Ameri et al., 2009) − was measured at a distance of 4.9 km from the
epicenter. The minimum positive PGA value (0.94 cm/s2) was recorded at a distance of 275.2 km
from the epicenter
To trace the spatial variability of the ground motion in the epicentral area, we spatially interpo-
lated the PGA values recorded by each station. Data interpolation was performed using the Kriging
algorithm (Davis and Sampson, 1986), which predicts unknown values using variograms to express
the spatial variation and minimizes the error of predicted values.
As shown in the close-up map of Figure 2, a PGA minimum threshold of 5 cm/s2 was graphically
set to filter out those areas affected to a marginal extent by the event. As apparent, the effects
of the shakes do not propagate uniformly across the ground, but are strongly influenced by the
geomorphological structures encountered along their path. The area of maximum PGA occurs
inside the surface projection of the fault. Note that, for the L’Aquila shakes, the PGA contours are
elongated in the north–south direction. The attenuation of PGA with distance from the epicenter
looks strongly asymmetric, with higher decay rate towards the west (Ameri et al., 2009). The spatial
interpolation allows us to accurately reconstruct the ground acceleration felt in each municipality of
the epicentral area during each shake.
2.2 The ItaNES survey
The survey data employed in this paper are provided by the Italian National Election Studies
(ItaNES), an inter-university consortium promoting research on voting behavior in Italy. In this
analysis we employ the “2011-2013 Inter-electoral panel study” released in 2014. Even if the study
provides longitudinal data covering the 2011-13 period, questions concerning the tax system were
only asked in the first wave. We thus only consider interviews administered in the first wave that
took place 18 months after the earthquake, in February 2011, to a sample stratified by gender, age,
education, region, and the demographic size of municipalities, as partitioned into 5 classes. ItaNES
also administered similar surveys over the period 2001-2006, however the questions differ among
surveys, and are posed to different samples, with a minimum overlap at the municipality level. This
prevents us from exploiting a difference in differences strategy.
As for our dependent variable, individual preferences about redistribution are measured by re-
coding responses to the question: “Tell me to what extent do you agree with the statement: “For
10
a society to be fair, the government should reduce differences in the socio-economic conditions of
people””, possible responses being “Strongly agree”, “Agree”, “Not agree nor disagree”, “Disagree”
and “Strongly disagree”. “Strongly agree” and “Agree” responses were coded as 1 to obtain a dummy
variable capturing support for redistribution. This indicator is standardly used, with slight differ-
ences, to measure the individuals’ demand for redistribution (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;
Guiso et al., 2006; Algan et al., 2016). For example, Algan et al. (2016) measure the individual
demand for redistribution through the score given by World Values Survey (WVS) respondents to
the following statements: “Incomes should be made more equal” versus “We need larger income dif-
ferences as incentives”. Guiso et al. (2006) derive an indicator of demand for redistribution from the
7 points-scale degree to which respondents of the US General Social Survey (GSS) feel close to the
statements “Some people think the government ought to reduce the income differences between the
rich and the poor” versus “Others think that the government should not concern itself with reducing
income differences”. Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) model the extent of redistribution desired by
individuals as their optimal tax rate, and measure it via the score given by GSS respondents to
the question: “Should the government reduce income differences between rich and poor?”. Similar
indicators were used to measure support for redistribution by Corneo and Gruner (2002), Luttmer
and Singhal (2011) and Dahlberg et al. (2012), to name just a few.
The survey also includes information on demographic characteristics, socio-economic status, po-
litical opinions, and possible downturns in the economic well-being of the household, which we
consider as additional controls in our econometric model. Since PGA is measured at the level of
municipality, we also add a battery of municipality-level controls including seismicity, altitude, lati-
tude and longitude, and other geographic characteristics. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics,
while Table 7 in the Appendix presents the definitions of the explanatory variables.
We then match survey data with the information on the average PGA registered throughout the
eight major shakes (section 3.1) and with the PGA level of each single shake (section 3.2). Survey
respondents are attributed the PGA felt in their municipality of residence.
2.3 Empirical strategy
To study the impact of repeated shocks, e.g. the L’Aquila earthquake, on demand for redistribu-
tion, we consider a linear probability model in which our dependent variable is the dummy described
11
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Redistribution 2,248 0.778 0.416 0 1
Age 2,247 51.226 18.124 18 98
Male 2,248 1.537 0.499 1 2
Education 2,248 2.344 0.899 0 4
Right wing 1,641 5.018 2.884 0 10
Religion 1,893 0.925 0.263 0 1
Country’s econ appraisal 2,225 1.819 0.826 1 5
Family’s econ appraisal 2,242 2.464 0.775 1 5
Sismicity 2,248 2.248 0.836 1 4
Latitude 2,248 42.863 2.864 9.276 46.947
Longitude 2,248 12.173 2.662 7.180 18.414
Altitude 2,248 3.863 1.324 1 5
Urban 2,248 1.913 0.744 1 3
Seaside 2,248 0.289 0.453 0 1
Mountain 2,248 1.491 0.749 1 3
Area 2,248 3.995 1.359 0.146 7.160
IT-2008-0004 2,248 0.189 0.274 0 1.80
IT-2009-0009 2,248 0.676 1.989 0 37.06
IT-2009-0032 2,248 0.265 0.914 0 9.18
IT-2009-0084 2,248 0.202 0.636 0 10.78
IT-2009-0095 2,248 0.211 0.672 0 8.17
IT-2009-0102 2,248 0.461 1.328 0 13.60
IT-2009-0121 2,248 0.342 1.142 0 19.10
IT-2009-0140 2,248 0.226 0.783 0 17.28
IT-2009-0174 2,248 0.147 0.564 0 18.02
in Section 2.2. Indeed, given a random sample, the OLS regression produces consistent and unbi-
ased estimators of the coefficients. Heteroskedasticity is accounted for by robust standard errors
clustered at the province level (Wooldridge, 2002). Preferences for redistribution are thus related to
individual characteristics, such as age, educational attainment, political and religious preferences,
that are widely acknowledged in the literature to explain attitudes towards redistribution.
With respect to our variable of interest, the exogeneity of the earthquake allows to circumvent
the endogeneity issues that are commonly at stake in the analysis of individual beliefs. We are aware
that exposure to natural disasters may also be affected by individual choices. There is evidence that
people move from areas frequently struck by recurrent events, such as tornados in the United States,
to reduce risk Boustan et al. (2012). However, no such evidence has ever been found in Europe
and with respect to earthquakes, which have a remarkably lower frequency and predictability. We
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can safely rule out the possibility that individuals self-selected into the epicentral area. First, no
seismic event was registered in the area from May 1985, 24 years before the earthquake we consider
in this paper. The 1985 event had ML = 4.2 and did not cause fatalities or injuries. Second, official
statistics clearly show that any significant change occurred in the population of the area over the
following years. After 1992, census data rather registered a slight increase in the population living
in L’Aquila and the surrounding municipalities (Istat, 2013a; 2013b). Overall, the demographic
balance and the migration balance of the epicentral area and the surrounding provinces have proved
stable over the two decades preceding the 2009 earthquake. The INGV, on the other hand, did not
update the seismic classification of the city, which kept the classification given in 1927 as a “Zone 2”
area, a very broad category comprising 27% of Italian municipalities.
Other geographical factors, however, could prevent an accurate identification of the effect of the
earthquake on individual beliefs. To tackle this issue, we also consider a battery of municipality-level
controls, including the official seismic classification of the city, and province fixed effects. Thus, we
first estimate the following equation to assess how preferences for redistribution relate to the average
intensity of the eight main shakes occurred over the eight days of the L’Aquila earthquake between
April 6 and 13, 2009.
redistributioni = α+ βL
′AquilaPGAc + γXi + δYi + dp + εi (1)
where L′AquilaPGA is the average peak ground acceleration registered throughout the eight
main shocks of the L’Aquila earthquake at the centroid of the respondent’s municipality of residence.
X is a vector of individual-specific characteristics collected in the ItaNES survey, Y is a vector of
municipality-level controls, and dp is a set of province dummies.
To study the possible role of the repetition and timing of the shocks, we then assess the rela-
tionship between the PGA of each shake and redistributive preferences by estimating eight further
versions of the same econometric model in which we replace the average intensity of the shakes with
the PGA of each of the main eight shakes (see Table 1 and Figure 2).
Unfortunately our data do not allow to observe individual preferences before and after the shocks.
To rule out the possibility that our results capture spurious correlations driven by a coincidence we
develop a series of counterfactuals. We first generate three placebo earthquakes in all similar to each
of the L’Aquila shakes that proved being significantly correlated with preferences for redistribution
13
in our sample. We randomly assign the epicenter of the placebo shakes to the municipalities in
which the accelerometric stations registered a null PGA during the actual earthquake (6,684, 6,914,
and 6,846 for the sixth, the seventh and eighth shake respectively). By replicating the propagation
pattern of the actual shakes, we are able to reconstruct how the shock would have been felt in
each municipality laying in the counterfeit epicentral area. We then assess how the placebo shakes
correlate with preferences for redistribution. We additionally repeat the placebo tests on a reduced
sample from which we exclude those municipalities in which at least one of the previous five shakes
had a PGA > 0 (5915, 5917 and 5921 for the sixth, the seventh and the eighth shake respectively).
We finally exploit information obtained from the placebo tests to conduct further robustness checks
on the estimations of the econometric model in Section 3.3 To further test the role of multiple vs.
single shocks, we exploit a natural counterfactual provided by an earthquake occurred 3.5 months
before in the province of Parma on December 23, 2008. Differently from the L’Aquila earthquake, this
seismic event consisted of one single shock of significant magnitude (ML = 5.2 and MW = 5.5) with
magnitude, acceleration and propagation pattern comparable to those of the main shakes registered
throughout the 2009 event.
3 Results
In this section we present the results of the econometric analysis. We start by analyzing how
the average intensity of the multiple shakes occurred over the L’Aquila earthquake between April 6
and 13 relates to preferences for redistribution (Section 3.1). We then present results for each single
shake (3.2). In the following subsections, we first present the results of the placebo analysis (3.3).
Then, we use a natural counterfactual to test the different effects of single vs. multiple shocks (3.4).
Finally, we briefly discuss our results (3.5).
3.1 The average intensity of the shock and support for redistribution
The baseline estimation in column 1 of Table 3 shows how preferences for redistribution correlate
with age, gender, education, and other personal traits, such as political and religious orientation.
In the following tables, the PGA is reported in decimeters for a more straightforward interpretation
of results. In line with standard predictions, right wing-biased respondents are less inclined to
support redistribution (e.g. Brooks and Brady, 1999; Gelman et al., 2007; Powdthavee and Oswald,
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2014). Christians are also less likely to support redistribution, consistently with previous findings
(e.g. Guiso et al., 2006). In column 2 we also control for perceived variations in the business cycle.
Individuals believing that the economic situation of the country has generally improved support
redistribution less. This result may be due to the belief that everyone will ultimately benefit from
the economic expansion thank to increased social mobility (see for example Bénabou and Ok, 2001).
Unfortunately, our survey data do not contain information on individuals’ perception of mobility
prospects. The self-reported level of the household economic welfare, on the other hand, is not
significantly correlated with support for redistribution.
In column 3 we add the average PGA registered throughout the eight main shakes of the L’Aquila
earthquake. The coefficient is positive and significant at 10% level. Column 4 shows that results are
robust to the addition of province fixed effects. In column 5, in addition to controlling for province
dummies, we add a battery of municipality-level controls. Results still hold and we do not observe
any systematic relationship of municipal covariates with support for redistribution. In addition,
we control for the classification of seismicity at the municipality level provided by the INGV. In
further robustness checks we also control for news consumption through television and the Internet
to test for the possible role of information (see for example Kuzmienko et al., 2015), for the use of
other types of media and contents, the work status of respondents and their self-reported interest in
politics. In all cases the additional controls are not statistically significant while our main finding
on L’Aquila earthquake is not affected.4
The size of the effect of the average PGA is economically relevant. The magnitude of the
coefficient implies that a 10 centimeters per square second increase in the average peak ground
acceleration of the shakes causes an increase in the likelihood of supporting redistribution of 3.2
percentage points.5 In absolute value, the effect is approximately three times higher than that of
political orientation and comparable to that of education.
3.2 Multiple shocks and support for redistribution
In this section we assess the possible role of repeated shocks by estimating equation (1) for
each of the eight main shakes occurred during the L’Aquila earthquake. Results are reported in
Table 4. Shakes are labelled with the ID established in the ITACA database and are reported in
4Results are available upon request.
5A 10 centimeters per square second acceleration is clearly perceptible by people and causes vibrations of objects
on the ground. A 20 centimeters per square second acceleration is strong enough to make people lose their balance.
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Table 3: L’Aquila earthquake and support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age 0.074***
(0.027)
0.072***
(0.027)
0.072***
(0.026)
0.055**
(0.027)
0.054**
(0.027)
Male 0.074***
(0.027)
0.034*
(0.020)
0.033*
(0.020)
0.023
(0.020)
0.023
(0.020)
Education 0.023*
(0.012)
0.031**
(0.012)
0.030**
(0.012)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
Right wing -0.018***
(0.003)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.013***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
Christian -0.087***
(0.031)
-0.084***
(0.031)
-0.084***
(0.031)
-0.070**
(0.032)
-0.071**
(0.032)
Country’s econ. sit. -0.059***
(0.014)
-0.059***
(0.014)
-0.062***
(0.014)
-0.062***
(0.014)
Household’s econ sit. -0.001
(0.015)
-0.001
(0.015)
-0.010
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
L’Aquila average PGA 0.013*
(0.001)
0.032*
(0.002)
0.032*
(0.002)
Seismicity -0.045
(0.031)
Latitude 0.003
(0.002)
Longitude -0.004
(0.061)
Altitude -0.011
(0.014)
Urban -0.005
(0.019)
Coastal -0.030
(0.036)
Mountain -0.014
(0.023)
Area 0.009
(0.013)
Constant 0.550***
(0.124)
0.637***
(0.127)
0.634***
(0.126)
0.723***
(0.129)
0.778
(0.769)
Province dummies NO NO NO YES YES
Observations 1,622 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608
R-squared 0.029 0.042 0.043 0.115 0.117
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the Municipality level in parentheses; *, **, *** significant
at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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chronological order from April 6 to 13, 2009. We observe that the first five shakes, occurred between
the 6th and the 7h of April, are not significantly correlated with our dependent variable. The sixth
shake, occurred on April 9, is statistically significant at 10% level. Statistical significance increases
for the last two shocks, occurred on April 9 and 13 respectively.
The size of the effect is economically relevant. Considering for example the seventh shock,
the magnitude of the coefficient implies that a 10 centimeters per square second increase in the
peak ground acceleration causes an increase in the likelihood of supporting redistribution of 3.0
percentage points. In absolute value, the effect is comparable to that of education, about half
of that of religion (studied for example in Guiso et al., 2006; Dills and Hérnandez-Julian, 2014;
Kirchmaier et al., 2018) and approximately three times higher than that of political orientation,
which was investigated in numerous studies (e.g. Corneo and Gruner, 2002 Gelman et al., 2007;
Powdthavee and Oswald, 2014). In all regressions we control for personal traits, the seismicity of
the municipality of residence, the other city-level variables reported in the last column of Table 3,
(which we omit from the Table for the sake of brevity), and province fixed effects. All covariates
maintain the same sign and significance throughout the eight shocks.
3.3 Placebo tests
To further check the robustness of our results, we implement a placebo test in the spirit of Abadie
and Hainmueller (2010) and Belloc et al. (2016). For each of the three statistically significant shakes
(IT-2009-0121, IT-2009-0140, and IT-2009-0174), we generate a series of placebo earthquakes with
the same intensity and propagation pattern but having their epicenter in the centroid of each of
the 6,684, 6,914, and 6,846 Italian municipalities outside of the actual epicentral areas of the sixth,
the seventh and the eighth shake respectively, i.e., those municipalities in which the strong motion
network registered a null PGA during the actual shakes. For each placebo event, we reconstruct a
propagation pattern by calculating the PGA of the shakes striking each municipality laying in the
counterfeit epicentral area based on the relationship between the distance from the epicenter and
the ground acceleration observed during each of the actually significant shakes. Overall, we thus
generate 6684 + 6914 + 6846 placebo shocks.
For each of the three significant shakes, we then randomly assign the epicenter of the relative
placebo shocks to the municipalities that were not hit by the shock. This allows us to estimate the
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Table 4: Multiple shocks and support for redistribution
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Date April 6 April 6 April 6 April 7 April 7 April 9 April 9 April 13
Age 0.054**
(0.027)
0.053*
(0.027)
0.053**
(0.027)
0.053**
(0.027)
0.054**
(0.027)
0.054**
(0.027)
0.054**
(0.027)
0.054**
(0.027)
Male 0.024
(0.021)
0.023
(0.020)
0.023
(0.020)
0.024
(0.020)
0.024
(0.020)
0.023
(0.020)
0.023
(0.020)
0.023
(0.020)
Education 0.029**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
0.028**
(0.013)
Right wing -0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
-0.012***
(0.004)
Christian -0.072**
(0.032)
-0.071**
(0.032)
-0.071**
(0.032)
-0.071**
(0.032)
-0.071**
(0.032)
-0.071**
(0.032)
-0.072**
(0.032)
-0.072**
(0.032)
Country’s
econ. sit.
-0.062***
(0.014)
-0.063***
(0.014)
-0.062***
(0.014)
-0.062***
(0.014)
-0.062***
(0.014)
-0.062***
(0.014)
-0.063***
(0.014)
-0.063***
(0.014)
Household’s
econ sit.
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
-0.009
(0.016)
Seismicity -0.043
(0.031)
-0.044
(0.031)
-0.044
(0.031)
-0.044
(0.031)
-0.045
(0.031)
-0.044
(0.031)
-0.045
(0.031)
-0.045
(0.031)
IT-2009-
0009
0.019
(0.001)
IT-2009-
0032
0.018
(0.002)
IT-2009-
0084
0.034
(0.002)
IT-2009-
0095
0.025
(0.003)
IT-2009-
0102
0.026
(0.002)
IT-2009-
0121
0.025*
(0.001)
IT-2009-
0140
0.030**
(0.001)
IT-2009-
0174
0.026**
(0.001)
Municipality-
level
controls
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Province
dummies
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608 1,608
R-squared 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.117
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the Municipality level in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and
1% level respectively.
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reaction of the individuals in the sample to three swarms of placebo earthquakes. More specifically,
the test is developed along the following steps for each of the significant shakes.
First, the PGA values recorded by the accelerometric stations during the shake are averaged
for each municipality. This allows to impute to those municipalities covered by more than one
accelerometric station one and only one PGA value. Second, we build a stylized version of the
actual shock by assuming that the shakes propagate across the ground in the very same way they
did during the actual shakes, so that the related PGA values change as a sole function of the radial
distance from the epicenter. As a result, the false epicentral areas have a circular geometry and
are partitioned into 12 circular sectors, each one with a specific value of PGA according to the
distance from the placebo epicenter. The PGA mean values calculated by radial distance from the
earthquake’s epicenters are reported in Tables 8-10 in the Appendix for the sixth, seventh and eighth
shake respectively.
Then, after imputing to the i municipality the PGA value of the epicenter’s municipality
(L’Aquila, in all the three cases), the PGA values of each circular sector have been calculated
by averaging the PGA values of all municipalities comprised in that specific radial bin, i.e. by con-
sidering the radial distance of the centroid of those municipalities from the centroid of the epicenter
municipality.
Following Belloc et al. (2016), the purpose of the tests is to check how many times the randomly
generated placebo estimates happen to be too close to the true estimates. If in our results we were
erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis that the coefficients of interest are equal to 0 in columns
(6), (7) and (8) of Table 4 (i.e., we were attributing to the shocks an effect that does not exist in
reality), we should observe placebo coefficients close to our true estimate, represented by the vertical
line in Figure 5, which reports the probability density function of the estimates of the coefficients of
the placebo shocks for the sixth shake - i.e. first of the three significant shakes, which occurred on
April 9, 2009.
The top panel of Figure 5 shows that the estimates generated in the test are almost always to
the left (meaning smaller in value than) the true estimated coefficients, equal to 0.03. Coefficients
of the 6,684 counterfeit earthquakes are distributed around zero. The fake estimated coefficient is
statistically significant at the 5% (10%) level in the 4.62% (7.25%) of cases. We then conduct a
second test by dropping from the sample not only the epicentral area of the sixth shake but also
the municipalities in which at least one of the previous five shakes was felt (i.e. where a PGA > 0
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Figure 3: Examples of the application of the placebo test based on the IT-2009-0121 shake to the
municipalities of: (a) Milan; (b) Naples.
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was registered). The number of counterfeit epicenters then becomes 5,915. The bottom panel of
Figure 5 shows that, also in this case, the estimates generated in the test are almost always to the
left (meaning smaller in value than) the true estimated coefficients. The fake estimated coefficient
is larger that the estimated one and statistically significant at the 5% (10%) level in the 4.53%
(6.99%) of cases. We get comparable results for the other two significant shakes.6 Overall these
results suggest that our findings on the relationship between the actual intensity of the shakes and
support for redistribution (Table 4, columns 6, 7 and 8) are not driven by a small number of treated
individuals in our sample and the potentially correlated nature of the error terms.
We then exploit the findings of the placebo test to run a further robustness check: we drop from
the estimation sample those “suspect” municipalities for which the placebo shocks have a statistically
significant and large coefficient and estimate our model again for the last three shakes. Results do
not change and are synthetically reported in Table 5, where we omit the coefficients of individual
and municipality-level controls for the sake of brevity. Results also hold if we keep the full sample
and include a dummy for the same municipalities.
Table 5: Multiple shocks and support for redistribution - Reduced sample
Date April 9 April 9 April 13
IT-2008-0004 0.026*
(0.014)
IT-2009-0140 0.030**
(0.014)
IT-2009-0174 0.026**
(0.013)
Individual controls YES YES YES
Municipality controls YES YES YES
Province fixed effects YES YES YES
Observations 1,587 1,603 1,597
R-squared 0.127 0.120 0.129
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the Municipality level in
parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
6The probability density functions of placebo tests for IT-2009-0140 and IT-2009-0174 are not reported for the
sake of brevity but are available upon request.
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Figure 4: Kernel density function of the placebo point estimates obtained based on the placebo
geometry of the sixth shake of the L’Aquila earthquake
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3.4 An isolated shock and support for redistribution: The Parma earthquake
To test the different impact of single versus multiple shocks, we exploit a natural counterfactual
provided by an earthquake occurred in the province of Parma, approximately 500 km North of
L’Aquila, just 3,5 months before the L’Aquila events. The Parma earthquake consisted of only
one main shock occurred on December 23, 2008, with MM = 5.5 (which was stronger than that of
seven of the eight shakes occurred during the L’Aquila earthquake). The metadata of the shake are
reported in Table 1 (column 1) an the propagation is illustrated in the top-left panel of Figure 2. The
shake is comparable in terms of energy, acceleration and propagation to those registered during the
L’Aquila earthquake, while being less destructive (as evident from the PGA contour plots reported
in Figure 3).
Results are reported in Table 6. The ground acceleration adverted during the earthquake (event
IT-2008-0004 in the ITACA dataset) is positively but not significantly correlated with support for
redistribution. Covariates are not shown to the sake of brevity, however the sign, size, and significance
of their coefficients do not differ from those reported in Table 4. This result supports the intuition
that the repetition of the traumatic shock plays a role in shaping social preferences.
Table 6: The Parma shock and support for redistribution
Date 2008, Dec 23
IT-2008-0004 0.111 (0.011)
Individual controls YES
Municipality controls YES
Province fixed effects YES
Observations 1,608
R-squared 0.117
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the Municipality level
in parentheses; *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5% and 1%
respectively.
3.5 Discussion
In Section 3.1 we illustrated a positive and significant relationship between the average intensity of
the shakes registered throughout the L’Aquila earthquake and individuals’ support for redistribution.
The analysis of the single shocks carried out in Section 3.2 revealed a complex picture, showing that
the average result was driven by the effect of the last three shakes occurred between April 9 and
13, 2009. Individuals that were repeatedly subjected to the trauma of the earthquake exhibited a
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support for redistribution increasing with the intensity of the last shocks they experienced. This
result suggests that some sort of cumulative effect of the shocks might have been at stake, as if the
repetition of the shock had increased its saliency in respondents’ perception, thereby strengthening
their behavioral response.
While this result is new in the economic studies on the outcomes of natural disasters, there is
consensus in the psychological literature that single and multiple shocks have different outcomes,
with most studies suggesting that repeated shocks prompt stronger emotional and behavioral re-
sponses. Distinct outcomes have been found for single versus multiple traumas - generally defined
as emotional responses to terrible events like an accident, an assault or a natural disaster7 - in terms
of distress (Williams et al., 2007), recurrent headache (Stesland et al., 2013), self-confidence (Allen
and Lauterbach, 2007), coping abilities (Dale et al., 2009), vagal regulation (Dale et al., 2009), au-
tomatic freezing-like responses (Hagenaars et al., 2012), interpersonal sensitivity (Hagenaars et al.,
2011), distrust (Foa et al., 1992), post-traumatic stress disorder and distress tolerance difficulties
(Gerber et al., 2018), and depression (Mustanski et al., 2016; Rytwinski et al., 2013). The difference
between single and multiple traumas seems to be more pronounced for non-interpersonal shocks
such as life-threatening accidents and natural disasters (Green et al., 2000; Williams et al., 2007).
Gerber et al., 2018 define a threshold of 3 over which the repetition of interpersonal shocks triggers
increasing mental reactions. In all cases, there is evidence that the strength of behavioral reactions
to traumas increases with the number of shocks following a dose-response relationship (Turner and
Lloyd, 1995).
A dose-response interpretation also seems to fit our results. In our sample, the significant and
positive relationship between redistributive preferences and the intensity of the l’Aquila shakes is
triggered only after a certain number of shocks. After the first five shocks, support for redistribution
becomes significantly increasing with the ground acceleration experienced by respondents for each
of the last three shakes.
Despite the rich economic literature on the behavioral and macroeconomic consequences of natu-
ral disasters like earthquakes and tornados, most of the existing studies view the shocks in isolation
(e.g. Callen, 2015; Belloc et al., 2016) or as aggregated events (e.g. Toya and Skidmore, 2014; Skid-
more and Toya, 2002). We add to this literature not only by studying so far uninvestigated social
preferences like support for redistribution, but also presenting evidence that shock experiences may
7American Psychological Association, https://www.apa.org/helpcenter/recovering-disasters.aspx, last accessed on
December 7, 2018.
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have cumulated effects and trigger a behavioral response depending both on intensity and repetition.
Even if all placebo tests support our results, findings must be taken with caution, given the
impossibility to exploit a difference in differences strategy due to the cross-sectional nature of the
data. However, our findings and measurement approach represent a novelty that certainly calls
for further investigations about the concurring roles of intensity, repetition, and timing of natural
disasters in shaping support for redistribution and social preferences in general.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we document that individuals who experienced one of the major earthquakes occurred in
Italy in the last three decades exhibit on average a significantly stronger preference for redistribution.
Unfortunate exogenous shocks like natural disasters can raise the belief that luck matters more than
merit in determining one’s position in the social ladder. Other studies previously documented,
theoretically and empirically, that beliefs about the importance of luck are a good predictor of the
individual support for redistribution (e.g. Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara,
2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). The natural experiment provided by the L’Aquila earthquake
allows us to bring evidence that the demand for redistribution is associated with the exposure to an
exogenous and randomly distributed traumatic shock.
The first part of the empirical analysis shows that the individual support for redistribution is
increasing with the average ground acceleration - i.e. the intensity of the shock - experienced during
the several main shakes occurred over the eight days of the L’Aquila earthquake. We then show
that the shocks are not all alike. We rather observe a cumulative effect such that only the last three
shocks prove to be significant predictors of support for redistribution, suggesting that some sort of
dose-response relationship might be at stake between the exposure to shocks and social preferences.
Despite the exogeneity of the earthquake, the cross-sectional nature of the data could prevent
a correct identification of its impact on preferences for redistribution. To deal with identification
concerns, we developed three counterfactuals and used them to perform placebo tests. Results of
the tests suggest an interpretation of our findings consistent with the theory that any increase in
the role of “pure random luck” implies a higher preference for redistribution (Alesina and Angeletos
(2005)).
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Although this work has focused on a specific natural disaster, the impact of pure random luck
may prove important in other contexts, even in light of its policy implications. Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) and Guiso et al. (2006), in fact, document a relationship between the proportion of peo-
ple supporting redistribution and the share of GDP spent on social welfare across countries and
American states respectively. Given the implications that consensus for redistribution has on the
actual implementation of redistributive policies, our findings call for further investigations on the
relationships connecting natural disasters, individuals’ opinions and beliefs, and public policies.
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Appendix
Table 7: Variables description
Age Log of age
Male Dummy equal to 1 if respondent is male
Education Ordinal variable coded as follows: 0=No education; 1=Primary
school; 2=Junior high school; 3=High school; 4=University
Right wing Ordinal variable ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 is extreme left
and 10 is extreme right
Christian Dummy equal to 1 for Christians and Jews, and 0 for other
religions, atheists and agnostics, as in Guiso et al. (2006)
Country’s econ. situation Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 that codes the response to
the question: "In your opinion, the economic situation of Italy
in the last year is:" 1= greatly worse; 2= partially worse;
3=unchanged; 4=partially improved; 5=greatly improved
Household econ. situation Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 that codes the response to
the question: "In your opinion, the economic situation of your
family in the last year is:" 1= greatly worse; 2= partially worse;
3=unchanged; 4=partially improved; 5=greatly improved
L’Aquila average PGA Average PGA recorded in the municipality of residence out of
the eight main shakes occurred on L’Aquila earthquake,
measured in dm/s2
Seismicity Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 4 that reports the ISTAT
official classification of municipalities according to their seismic
class
Latitude Municipality latitude defined in decimal degrees
Longitude Municipality longitude defined in decimal degrees
Altitude Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 5 that reports the ISTAT
official classification of municipalities according to their altitude
class
Urban Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 3 that reports the ISTAT
official classification of municipalities according to their
urbanization class
Coastal Dummy equal to 1 for coastal municipalities
Mountain Ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 3 that reports the ISTAT
official classification of municipalities according to their
mountain status
Area Log of Municipality area in square km
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Table 8: PGA mean values calculated by radial distance from sixth shake’s actual epicenter (IT-
2009-0121)
Circular
sector id
Radial distance from
earthquake’s epicenter (km)
Mean PGA
(cm/s2)
Involved
municipalities
Min Max
0 0 0 292.58 1
1 0 10 153.74 3
2 10 20 126.42 13
3 20 30 72.8 18
4 30 40 54.64 44
5 40 50 42.68 74
6 50 60 28.89 102
7 60 70 15.79 114
8 70 80 17.37 99
9 80 90 20.58 100
10 90 100 20 91
11 100 125 9.09 257
12 125 150 1.79 207
Table 9: PGA mean values calculated by radial distance from seventh shake’s actual epicenter
(IT-2009-0140)
Circular
sector id
Radial distance from
earthquake’s epicenter (km)
Mean PGA
(cm/s2)
Involved
municipalities
Min Max
0 0 0 337.69 1
1 0 10 145.21 2
2 10 20 93.36 13
3 20 30 42.55 18
4 30 40 29.34 44
5 40 50 25.35 74
6 50 60 17.16 102
7 60 70 9.92 114
8 70 80 10.13 99
9 80 90 12.87 100
10 90 100 13.53 91
11 100 125 8.11 257
12 125 150 3.55 207
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Table 10: PGA mean values calculated by radial distance from eighth shake’s actual epicenter
(IT-2009-0174)
Circular
sector id
Radial distance from
earthquake’s epicenter (km)
Mean PGA
(cm/s2)
Involved
municipalities
Min Max
0 0 0 261.84 1
1 0 10 106.29 2
2 10 20 47.35 13
3 20 30 25.61 18
4 30 40 18.44 44
5 40 50 12.59 74
6 50 60 8.88 102
7 60 70 7.75 114
8 70 80 7.77 99
9 80 90 8.97 100
10 90 100 8.45 91
11 100 125 4.33 257
12 125 150 1.25 207
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